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M i C h i e l  l e e z e n B e r g shortcomings in explanations of the 
Enlightenment that do not pay suffi-
cient attention to modern science; and 
from the scientific point of view, the 
Dutch contribution has been minor. On 
the other hand, Spinoza, Erasmus, and 
other Dutchmen have made important 
contributions to the Enlightenment.
I have a personal relationship with 
Spinoza; I feel a certain similarity in 
my fate with that of Spinoza: because 
of some of his unorthodox views, he 
was excommunicated, and had to leave his place of birth in Am-
sterdam. Of course, Spinoza’s was not a biblical God; I think it is 
very unfair, however, to call Spinoza an atheist. Some of his ideas 
are very relevant to the modern Muslim world: reconciling the reli-
gious law with democracy and providing a modern understanding 
of the state is much like what Spinoza has been doing. What makes 
Spinoza modern is that he historicizes all prophethood; but his 
ideas of prophethood are inspired in part by al-Farabi and Moses 
Maimonides.1 Like al-Farabi, Spinoza thinks that philosophy is prior 
and superior to prophethood: philosophers usually work with their 
speculative or intellectual faculty (‘aql), whereas prophets mainly 
work through the imagination; they cast the universal in particulars 
and symbols and thus make it accessible to the layman. All of this 
you can find in Spinoza, but the roots are in al-Farabi; Maimonides 
thinks that prophet Moses is above imagination, but for Spinoza, all 
prophets are on the same footing. 
More relevantly, Spinoza thinks that religion is not incompatible 
with democracy. He thinks about religious democracy. He shows 
that secularism is neither necessary nor sufficient for a democratic 
state. For example, in present-day Turkey, many people think that 
secularism is necessary for a democratic state; elsewhere, people 
seem to think that secularism is sufficient. According to Spinoza, 
however, you can be a democrat out of a religious motivation and 
out of religious obligations to spread democracy, to separate pow-
ers, and so on.
ML: Perhaps the distinction you make sheds a light on the differences 
between al-Farabi and Spinoza: you suggest that the Enlighten-
ment is not just a matter of political philosophy, but also involves a 
specific sense of rationality, and experimental natural science. Al-
Farabi sees rationality as superior to revelation, but he does not 
propagate democracy, and he does not talk about experimental 
science. Your suggestion that it was his Aristotelianism that blocked 
the development of experimental science based on nominalism 
might be worth pursuing.
AS:  I have done some work on the question of why empirical science 
in the modern sense did not develop in the Islamic world. The 
predominance of Aristotelianism does not explain it, because it 
dominated European scholasticism as well. Some historians of the 
Enlightenment argue that most of what we call Enlightenment and 
modernity was reaction against the idea of an omnipotent God; in 
Islam, Sufism rather than science was the reaction: it tried to make 
God a lovable rather than an omnipotent God. 
ML: Your critique reminds me of the way in which in the Indian subcon-
tinent, Muhammad Iqbal argued that it was Sufism, which he sees 
as a specifically Persian element in Islam that undermined every-
Just prior to Soroush’s departure from 
the Netherlands, Michiel Leezenberg 
talked with him about the philosophi-
cal origins and dimensions of mo-
dernity in the Islamic world. Soroush 
opened with some of his impressions 
of the Dutch public debate on Islam, 
democracy, and secularism. 
AS:  Maybe due to recent events, and 
maybe due to the media, Islamic 
identity has become very central 
to Muslims here; nevertheless, they 
consider themselves Dutch citizens. What worried them was that 
newspapers and television are very expressly inimical to Islam and 
give a distorted picture. Even Dutch academics, I found, are not 
very knowledgeable about both Islamic culture and lands. Local 
Muslims want to abide by the law, and want the authorities to re-
spect Islam just as much as any other religion, and to do full justice 
to secularism, i.e. impartiality towards all religions. In the United 
States, where I lived for five years, the whole atmosphere is more 
religious. In the Netherlands and France, it is not a very welcome 
thing to be a religious person.
ML: The Dutch press is not only dominated by a secular outlook, but 
also by the slogan that Islam has not yet had an Enlightenment. 
This has—in part inadvertently—been fed by studies like Jonathan 
Israel’s Radical Enlightenment (2000), which argue that the Enlight-
enment actually started in Holland, and more specifically in the cir-
cle around the Dutch philosopher Spinoza. According to this view, 
the truly radical Enlightenment of the Spinoza circle was expressly 
anti-clerical, atheist, materialist, and even feminist, and anti-coloni-
alist. What do you think of the idea that the Muslim world at large, 
or Islam as a religion, has not had this process of Enlightenment 
yet?
AS:  There has not been anything corresponding to the Enlightenment 
in the European sense in the Islamic world: neither modern phi-
losophy, nor modern empirical science, nor the modern notion of 
freedom. These only gained currency in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. I believe, however, that in the early twenty-first 
century, to blindly follow the eighteenth-century Enlightenment 
may not be defensible anymore. Enlightenment in the European 
sense has its historic specificity that cannot be recreated; a reform 
in Islamic lands would be by definition different from the European 
Enlightenment.
According to some historians, the Islamic Enlightenment oc-
curred much earlier, but due to historical reasons, it could not 
continue. We cannot say that rationalism or secularism was absent 
from the scene. In theology or kalam, you have the rationalist and 
quasi-secular Mu‘tazilites, who relied on reason in coming to know 
God and in moral thinking. Unfortunately the rationalism of the 
Mu‘tazilites was Aristotelian. This was very inauspicious: the Euro-
pean Enlightenment is based on a nominalist rationalism, whereas 
Islamic rationalism was Aristotelian and non-nominalist. Mulla 
Sadra’s philosophy, despite its appearance, is totally nominalistic; 
it might bring a kind of modern Enlightenment. 
Part of the Enlightenment, of course, is the advancement of mod-
ern empirical science, and therefore I have looked at the Enlighten-
ment through the spectacles of philosophy and science. There are 
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tions. One of the main functions is to liberate reason from greed, 
selfishness, and many other diseases; and through liberating rea-
son to create a liberated man, which is the main objective of all 
religion and all mysticism. I think everyone, everywhere at any time 
needs such kinds of teaching. 
ML: Does that fit in with your main criticism of Shariati? If I recall cor-
rectly, you reproach him for politicizing religion, whereas you think 
the core, not only of Islam but of all religions, is private faith (iman). 
Did you get that view from Rumi? It need not be a politically quiet-
ist faith, because it doesn’t exclude public or political action. 
AS:  I am not a person who lives in isolation, nor do I invite anyone to 
live an isolated life; and Rumi was not like that either. Even as a Sufi, 
you still have obligations, e.g. vis-a-vis justice. Shariati’s activism 
was very one-sided, as it was tilted towards politicized Islam and 
revolution. Islam also has a spiritual side. I think it is so powerful 
and so important that it has to be reintroduced in modern times. 
ML: You argue that the classical Islamic notion of justice (‘adala) as a 
hierarchical order imposed by a ruler in order to avoid social chaos 
overlaps with modern liberal rights-based conceptions of justice. 
Does that imply that modern Islamists and liberals are divided by 
a common language of rights? Would you suggest that you can 
speak of a common modernity shared between Islamists and secu-
lar liberals, or are there bigger differences between them? 
AS:  There are big differences, no doubt about it. In my own characteri-
zation, modern culture is a rights-based culture, whereas pre-mod-
ern or religious culture was duty- or obligation-based. It does not 
mean that these two are totally at loggerheads, but the emphasis 
is different. Modern man is seen as freed from the bondage of re-
ligion, and as having exiled God to the remote heavens; but he is 
very close to a morally deterring kind of egoism. In the religious 
atmosphere, you are supposed to be more humble and conscious 
of your obligations. Now can duty- and rights-based views be rec-
onciled? Both have their shortcomings. What we need is neither to 
combine nor to eliminate the two, but perhaps a third paradigm. 
Perhaps we should revalue the concept of virtue, which may do 
justice to both obligations and rights. 
During the ugly episode of the publication of cartoons of the 
prophet Muhammad, the people in favour of publication empha-
sized the publisher’s right to free speech. Although this argument 
is based on the language of rights, I find it very weak. Rights always 
give you a number of choices. You will not be prosecuted because 
you have published it, fine; but you had the right to publish or not 
to publish. The language of rights is not satisfactory in explaining 
what one has to do. The language of obligations has no such short-
coming: its explanatory power is much bigger than that of the lan-
guage of rights. In order to have both rights, which is a beautiful 
thing, and the more powerful explanation of obligations, we need 
a third paradigm; perhaps one of love, perhaps one of virtue. 
ML: You sound a bit like communitarians like Alisdair MacIntyre and 
Charles Taylor, who also argue that liberal individualism runs into 
contradictions. Would you say that today’s worldwide newly visible 
public religiosity has always been around but has found a new way 
of legitimately expressing itself in public (as has been said about 
the recent electoral victory of the Islamist AKP in Turkey), or would 
you take it as a sign that some of the classical ideals of liberal secu-
larism are untenable, or more dramatically, 
that liberalism has failed in some respects? 
AS:  Well, liberalism—as the culture of rights—has 
definitely failed in some respects, and I think 
the secularization thesis has proved wrong. 
People expected a continuous decline of re-
ligion in society, but now we see the reverse. 
We live in a postmodern era, one of the main 
blessings of which is that the sharp dichoto-
mies of the past, e.g. between secularism and 
religion, and even science and religion, are 
getting blurred. These are relics of the positiv-
ist era, and no longer tenable. 
thing that was activist and intellectual and modernist in Islam. For 
him, Sufism was egocentric, politically quietist, and otherworldly. 
Intriguingly, he pits Nietzschean views of the ego and the will 
against traditional mystical notions of self-annihilation (fana’).
AS:  One of the things I like in Iqbal is his emphasis on free will. I would 
like to suggest that free will has been a suppressed entity in both 
Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism. The Sufis are determin-
ists, even fatalists: they see human beings as toys in the hands of 
God, who cannot control themselves. In Islamic philosophy, the law 
of causality is so powerful that it, too, corners free will. Free will is 
part and parcel of the Enlightenment and of modernity. In Iqbal 
you see it maybe for the first time in Islam. In his magnum opus, The 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, he proposes to reintro-
duce the idea of free will and an open future; and through this, he 
comes to a new conception of God and of religious interpretation. 
This is why Iqbal is so relevant for today’s questions; and mind you, 
it is also one of the Mu‘tazila’s ideas. They, too, emphasize free will 
(ikhtiyar).2 
ML: You yourself very often refer to Iqbal and Ali Shariati, who in turn 
gets many of his ideas from Iqbal. Has your reading of classical au-
thors like Rumi, Saadi, and Mulla Sadra been shaped by the ideas 
and concerns of these modernists, or did reading the classics con-
versely shape the way you understand modernists like Iqbal and 
Shariati, or even Anglo-Saxon philosophers like Quine, Popper, 
and Kuhn? And do you think that classical authors like Spinoza and 
al-Farabi can play a more than symbolic role in contemporary de-
bates?
AS:  I think our whole life is filled with infatuations: you come across 
somebody by chance, and then you become interested. I liked the 
argumentative character of Islamic philosophy. I also liked Anglo-
Saxon philosophy of science because of its analytical approach to 
problems; I am still using these analytical tools. Of course, neither 
Iqbal nor Shariati proceeded analytically. Iqbal was infatuated with 
Nietzsche and Bergson; Shariati had read Sartre and Fanon. I prefer 
Iqbal as a philosopher: he sometimes has very deep insights, and 
he is a poet of the first rank. Shariati was really a prophet in Spino-
za’s sense: a man of rhetoric and the imaginative faculty. He also 
turned Islam into an ideology, something that Iqbal never dreamt 
of doing. He had a very great influence in bringing about the Is-
lamic revolution; but nowadays, we have to be very critical about 
what he says, and not take him as a guru or a leader. 
I discovered Rumi quite early in my life. Rumi has a lot to say, not 
only to me, but to modern man, about the liberation of reason. Of 
course, he teaches about love; but for him, love has different func-
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Notes
1. The connections between Maimonides’ and 
Spinoza’s views on prophecy have been 
explored in detail by, among others, Heidi 
Rawen, “Some Thoughts on What Spinoza 
Learned from Maimonides about the 
Prophetic Imagination,” Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 39, nos. 2 and 3 (2001). 
2. The Mu‘tazila were an important rationalist 
school in early Islamic speculative theology 
(kalam); in Sunni Islam, they were eclipsed 
by the rise of Ash‘ari theology, but among 
Shiites, their doctrines remained influential.
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